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INTRODUCTION: STEPPING INTO DARK POOLS

In early 2016, Barclays and Credit Suisse found themselves in
the midst of a settlement with the Securities Exchange Commission
311

312
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("SEC") over dark pool activity for a combined total of $154.3 million.'
Barclays alone settled for $70 million as a result of its
misrepresentations regarding the methods used for monitoring highfrequency trade ("HFT") activity within its dark pool, "Barclays LX." 2
As part of its settlement, the London-based bank also agreed to the
implementation of an independent third-party consultant to review how
the firm manages certain aspects of its dark pool business. 3 Credit
Suisse-who also faced charges of misrepresentation regarding the use
of its dark pool, "Crossfinder," to facilitate internal order flow-settled
for $84.3 million. 4 After the settlement, New York Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman stated, "These cases mark the first major victory in
the fight against fraud in dark pool trading that began when we first
sued Barclays: coordinated and aggressive government action,
admissions of wrongdoing, and meaningful reforms to protect investors
from predatory, high-frequency traders."5 Schneiderman later noted,
"We will continue to take the fight to those who aim to rig the system
and those who look the other way." 6

A dark pool, a form of Alternative Trading System ("ATS"), is a
private securities trading platform that-unlike public exchanges such
as the New York Stock Exchange-allows participants to execute large
block trades with delayed public disclosure.7 As neither party in a dark
market transaction is trading on the public, or "lit," market or knows
the identity of its counterparty, dark market trades allow participants
to trade anonymously and keep trade strategies from competitors. 8
Further, because dark market trades do not have to be publicly
disclosed in real time, the price of a given security will, theoretically,
stay relatively stable as the order is filled.9 As such, dark market trades
are said to have "reduced market impact," which generally results in
more favorable overall pricing to buyers and sellers.10 While a number
of larger banking institutions advertise "dark pool" services, these

1.
See Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, Barclays, Credit Suisse Agree to Dark Pools Settlements,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2016, 9:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.cominews/articles/ 2016-0131/barclays-credit-suisse-to-pay- 154-3-million-in-dark-pool-deals [https:/perma.cc/924H-JDG5].
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital Inc., 1 N.Y.S.3d 910, 911-12 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2015).
8.
See id.
9.
Id. at 912.
10. Id.
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services vary widely in size and nature." Furthermore, these relatively
new financial instruments have little recognition within the law.
Despite the regulatory issues posed by the mortgage crisis in 2008, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed
in 2010 does not directly address dark pool trading within U.S. equity
markets. 12 While dark pools offer a number of benefits to both retail and
institutional investors, including the supposed ability to hedge against
HFT arbitrage, a number of informational and regulatory gaps brought
about by dark pools' statuses as ATSs present issues to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934's goal of "protecting investors, maintaining fair,
orderly and efficient markets, and facilitating the formation of
capital." 13
To address these regulatory gaps, this Note proposes that the
SEC expand its proposed regulations by issuing quality trade"
facilitation ratings that give existing and prospective dark pool
participants meaningful comparison criteria upon which to evaluate the
effect different services have on quality execution. Such a rating would,
for example, provide investors with insight as to how well a particular
pool facilitates trades relative to the market given order size, order
type, and services offered, among other criteria. In a sense, this system
could be considered a more expansive version of the SEC's proposed
Regulation ATS-N. Such a system would not only reduce the negative
trading effects associated with dark pools, but would also limit missed
liquidity, 14 foster predictability, prevent against market manipulation,
promote best execution, cure information asymmetry, and reduce
barriers to entry to smaller investors. Part I explains how dark pools
operate, describes how pools vary in size, form, and function, and lists
the potential costs and benefits to dark market liquidity, generally. Part
II analyzes previously proposed solutions to dark pool regulation and
their accompanying drawbacks. Part III proposes an independent
quality trade facilitation rating system as a solution to the problems
facing the dark market.

11. Id.
12. See 12 C.F.R. § 242 app. A (2013).
13. Edward M. Eng et al., Finding Best Execution in the Dark: Market Fragmentationand
the Rise of Dark Pools, 12 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 39, 46 (2013); see 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012). These
informational and regulatory gaps include delayed public disclosure, lack of execution quality and
transparency for dark pool participants, and an inability for traders to accurately assess available
liquidity. See Eng, supra, at 45-46.
14. Liquidity refers to the extent to which a security can be bought or sold and converted to
cash.
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I. DARK POOLS DEFINED

As mentioned, dark pools vary in size, form, and function.
Generally, however, a dark pool is an ATS, or private securities
exchange platform, that directly links buyers and sellers looking to
trade large blocks of securities with reduced market impact.15 There are
currently more than forty ATSs registered with the SEC, with Credit
Suisse's "Crossfinder" being the largest as of September 2015.16
Crossfinder alone executed more than forty-seven million trades in the
third quarter of 2015, involving over 8.5 million shares at an average
trade size of 181.17 While such trades provide various benefits-

including more favorable pricing than the lit market and concealing
trade strategies from other competitive institutions-they come at the
cost of decreased transparency.1 8 Critics of dark pool trading argue that
it reduces lit market transparency and efficiency, decreases liquidity,
impairs price movement, and creates conflicts of interest between
brokers and dark pool providers. 19 In an attempt to balance such
countervailing concerns, these critics and the SEC have proposed a
number of solutions that vary in form and complexity, including the real
time disclosure of dark market trades and limiting the size of such
trades. 20 The practicality and long-term effects of such proposals,
however, remain untested and subject to speculation. Ultimately,
issuing quality trade facilitation ratings seems to be a more effective
way of balancing regulatory and investment-based trepidation.
To more effectively understand this Note's solutions and how
added front-end disclosure is a superior solution to the current
regulatory scheme, this Part provides a historical overview of dark pool
evolution, a discussion of the various dark pool platform structures, and
the risks and benefits that come with dark market liquidity, generally.

15. See Schneiderman, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 912.
16. See ATS TransparencyData Quarterly Statistics, Third Quarter of 2015, All ATS Stocks,
http://www.finra.org/industry/ats/ats-transparency-data-quarterly-statistics
FINRA
(2016),
[https://perma.cc/AS83-K2B7].
17. Id.
18. Christopher Mercurio, Dark Pool Regulation, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 69, 70 (2013).
19. Id.
20. Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on the
Security and Exchange Commission's RegulatoryProposal ConcerningDark Pools of Liquidity, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1043 (2010).
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A. Regulation ATS and the Dark Pool Loophole
In the mid-1900s, the market for securities was highly
fragmented. 21 Market fragmentation, or a lack of a centralized
information and trade feed, resulted in rampantly inefficient prices that
hindered traders' prospects for best execution. 22 Best execution, in
simplest terms, is the most favorable price for a customer at the time a
stock is traded. 23 In response, Congress amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") in 1975 to charge the SEC
with the goal of creating a unified securities market, thus promoting
price stability, investor confidence, and general market efficiency. 24
This nationalized, uniform system for securities trading eventually
became known as the National Market System. 25 The rationale of such
a system was that if all investors could see all current quotes and routeto the venue offering the best price, the market would be protected from
inefficiency and opportunistic behavior. 26 Although the marketplace
would "still be fragmented where different trading venues compete for
order flow, best execution would be secured by routing to the venue with
the best pricing." 27
Despite the creation of the National Market System, Regulation
ATS ("Reg ATS"), enacted in 1998, was created to allow a small number
of trades to be executed on platforms not subject to the strict regulatory
requirements for public exchange formation under section 6 of the
Exchange Act. 28 Further, Regulation NMS ("Reg NMS"), enacted in
2005, was created to help the regulatory scheme adapt to shifts in
technology and market complexity. 29 However, Reg NMS, Reg ATS, and
21. See In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342,
348 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
22. Id.
In other words, best execution is a purchase at the lowest possible price for a buyer or a
23.
sale at the highest possible price for a seller. See Eng et al., supra note 13, at 46.
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2015); Eng et al., supra note 13, at 46.
25. Eng et al., supranote 13, at 46.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Hatch, supra note 20, at 1036. Becoming a national securities exchange under section 6
of the Exchange Act is comparatively much more involved. The process usually takes years of
submitting detailed information regarding how bids are accepted and how trades are processed.
Drafts of these processes are submitted to the SEC and posted for public comment. In addition to
the stricter reporting requirements of national exchanges regarding quotes, bids, and market
participants, the method of a given exchange's execution falls subject to more public and regulatory
scrutiny. The high-risk nature of the securities industry has made for an ever-changing regulatory
scheme, and improved regulation over time has resulted in heightened levels of accountability,
fraud monitoring, and general investor protection. Currently, however, the process for dark pool
formation under Regulation ATS is not nearly as stringent or disciplined. See id. at 1048-49.
29. Eng et al., supranote 13, at 46.
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the Exchange Act contained subtle loopholes that allowed for trades to
be executed without public price disclosure. 30
Effectively, section 5 of the Exchange Act and Reg ATS allowed
ATSs to execute trades without the need for immediate public
disclosure.3 1 Instead of going through the meticulous process of public
exchange formation, ATSs could simply register as broker-dealers
under section 15 of the Exchange Act. 32 Moreover, the public quoting
and disclosure requirements of Reg NMS did not apply to ATSs as long
as they executed no more than five percent of a particular stock's
national daily trading volume. 33 This "loophole" allowed for the
inception of the dark liquidity market. 34 The concept of keeping
transactions "dark" was further advanced by the reporting standards
issued by the Consolidated Tape Association ("CTA"), an organization
that oversees the dissemination of trade and quote information over a
number of public exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange. 35
While ATSs were required to disclose dark market trade parties
postexecution, such disclosure could occur weeks after the trade had
been completed. 36 Still more, the CTA plan did not require ATSs to
report exactly when a brokered transaction had occurred. 37
The lax disclosure standards brought about by Reg ATS and the
CTA allowed institutional traders to keep their trading strategies from
competitors and the general public. 38 This loophole also created a
distinct execution advantage for block trades, as the five percent
threshold allowed dark pools to move large amounts of stock, while the
CTA reporting standards made it nearly impossible to determine when
and which securities were actually trading hands. 39 Further, the
development of new trading software and more advanced algorithmic
trading processes made ATS trades still more profitable to those same

30. Hatch, supra note 20, at 1036.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Exchanges reporting to the consolidated feed were required to disclose information
regarding (1) the price, size, and exchange on which a given trade was executed; (2) the highest
and lowest bid offers, including volume information, for a given security; and (3) the National Best
Bid Offer. In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342,
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
36.
Hatch, supra note 20, at 1036-37.
37. Id. at 1037.
38.
See id.
39. Id.
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dark market participants. 40 Complex computer systems could quickly
spread large bulk orders among the growing number of available ATS
venues, thus reducing the costs associated with missed liquidity 41 and
elevated administrative fees. 42 More advanced software on both the
investor and host sides of the dark market allowed for orders to be
matched almost immediately, and automated host execution processes
further allowed for reduced transaction costs. 4 3
On one hand, the increasing profitability, perceived
informational advantage, and heightened barriers to entry for smaller
market participants seemed to disproportionately favor the already
large and profitable institutional investors. 44 Conversely, proponents of
dark liquidity argued that ATSs relied largely on smaller investors to
supply securities on the sell side. 45 As such, these proponents argued
that smaller investors without access to the dark market still saw the,
benefit of heightened liquidity and more efficient pricing. 46
Analysts and the public slowly began to voice concerns regarding
dark pool formation and its competition with the lit market in the midto late-2000s. 47 Critics worried that the dark nature of the pools would
result in a lack of investor confidence that lit market securities were, in
fact, efficiently priced. 4 8 Following the financial crash of 2008, public
distrust of complex financial products resulted in a call for heightened
scrutiny by the SEC. 4 9 Mary Schapiro, appointed to head of the SEC in
2009, came to office with a mission to fill any regulatory gaps that had
the potential to result in another credit default swap-like setback for
the U.S. economy.50 Among the complex financial products and services
40.
See Yesha Yadav, The Failureof Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1035
(2016) ("Instead of relying on human beings to perform the task of submitting orders, routing them
to exchanges, and concluding and completing trades, these functions are instead undertaken by
algorithms. Unlike human traders, computers can transact in microseconds, at high volumes, and
deploy an enormous reserve of data and quantitative input to inform trading.").
41. "Missed liquidity" generally refers to a trader's inability to capitalize on available but
unused liquidity hidden in the dark pool network. For a more expansive discussion of missed
liquidity, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42. See Hatch, supranote 20, at 1037.
43. Id.
44. See People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Barlcays Captial Inc., 1 N.Y.S.3d 910, 911-12 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2015).
45. See In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342,
349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
46. Id.
47. Hatch, supranote 20, at 1039.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 1040.
50. Id. at 1040-41. Credit default swaps were among the most notorious financial products
that received added attention post-2008. For more discussion about these financial products and
their added media attention, see Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME
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that caught Schapiro's eye was dark pool trading.5 1 While investor
protection was at the forefront of SEC concerns, some of the most avid
opponents to dark pool formation and use were the securities exchanges
themselves. 52
The exchanges worried that lax regulatory requirements would
eventually result in a loss of overall market share, as dark liquidity
offered a number of advantages that could not be achieved in the lit
market. 53 Conversely, banks and other independent dark pool hosts
feared that overregulation could impose debilitating or even fatal
effects on an otherwise helpful and profitable financial service. 54
Though such opponents of overregulation were open to small
administrative changes, they strongly advocated market diversity and
the ability to freely pursue best execution.5 5
In light of this technical regulatory evolution, and to more fully
explain dark pools' function within the financial sector, the next section
provides an explanation of how dark pools are practically used and
applied.
B. General Dark Pool Platform Structure
Traditionally, securities have been traded on major exchanges
or, in light of recent technological advances, on global electronic
marketplaces or electronic communications networks.5 6 These more
familiar trading venues are often referred to as the "downstairs"
market.5 7 However, all major equities markets also employ brokerage
firms in the so-called "upstairs market" that look to match hopeful
buyers directly with potential sellers, negotiate trade agreements, and,
ideally, facilitate best execution.5 8 The upstairs market promotes best
execution by allowing block trades to be executed with less price
variance and reduced market impact. 59 Accordingly, upstairs venue
hosts make money by facilitating trades and charging a premium (often
miniscule in comparison to filling an order on the lit market) to

(Mar.
17,
2008),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7AC-VZ9S].
51.
See Hatch, supranote 20, at 1041.
52. Id. at 1042.
53.
See Eng et al., supranote 13, at 43; see also Hatch, supra note 20, at 1042.
54.
See Hatch, supra note 20, at 1042.
55. Id. at 1042-43.
56.
Eng et al., supranote 13, at 42.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 42.

2017]

SECURITIES BLACK MARKET

319

customers for its services, relying on trade volume for profitability.6 0 As
such, and with the goal of best execution in mind, the existence of the
upstairs market has contributed to the rise of dark pool trading as a
primary investment vehicle for institutional investors. 6 1 These dark
pools, however, vary widely in form and function.
1. Sell-Side Firms Versus Independent Providers
First, some dark pools are set up by independent providers,
while others are provided by sell-side firms. 62 Independent providers
are entities set up for the sole purpose of running a dark pool. 63 In
contrast, sell-side hosts, such as Credit Suisse, often act as both an
investment bank and a dark pool host.6 4 Technological advances have
allowed for increased trade volume for sell-side firms and have made
the prospect of matching internal order flow more practicable and
lucrative.65 At base, sending orders to the downstairs market costs
money, as bid/ask spreads and other fees cut into sell-side firm
commission margins. 66 A sell-side firm's ability to directly match its
customers' orders against each other and against the firm's own
proprietary pool avoids the costs associated with going to market and
employing an otherwise costly outside marketmaker. 67
There are, however, a number of potential concerns with the use
of internalized dark pools. Depending on the size or nature of the sellside firm, questions may arise as to how anonymous such trading really
is.68 Furthermore, while best execution is a general goal of dark
liquidity, investors engaged in a firm's internalized dark pool might not
be sufficiently protected from abuse.6 9 In 2011, for example, the SEC

60. See id. at 41.
61. Id. at 43.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Baricays Captial Inc., 1 N.Y.S.3d 910, 911-12 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2015); see also In re ITG Inc. & Alternet Sec. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9887,
Exchange Act Release No. 75672, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16742 (Aug. 12, 2015); In
re UBS Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9697, Exchange Act Release No. 74060,
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16338 (Jan. 15, 2015); In re LavaFlow, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 72673; Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-15985 (July 25, 2014); In re Liquidnet,
Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9596, Exchange Act Release No. 72339, Administrative Proceeding
No. 3-15912 (June 6, 2014); In re eBX, LLC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67969,
Administrative Proceeding No. 3-15058 (Oct. 3, 2012); Joshua Gallu & Nina Mehta, Pipeline
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brought an enforcement action against Pipeline LLC for falsely
advertising that it had "no prop[rietary trading] desk gaming
[customer] orders" and that the pool's trading opportunities, furnished
by other customers, were entirely "natural."7 0 In other words, Pipeline
assured its customers that its dark pool was entirely free from internal
and proprietary trading.7 1 However, one of Pipeline's affiliates not only
engaged in proprietary trading, but also found itself subject to a distinct
informational advantage which it used to front-run and profit off other
customers' orders. 72
2. Trade Frequency
Second, dark pools differ in croSS 7 3 and trade frequency. Some
dark pools only look to cross or trade at set intervals, while others look
to cross or trade continuously. 74 Investment Technology Group, for
example, crosses at set periods throughout the day, while other pools,
such as Liquidnet and Pipeline, cross on a continuum. 75 The presence
of high-frequency traders and the potential for abuse may determine
how frequently a host decides to cross or trade. To be sure, HFT firms
stand to profit more off platforms that trade continuously, as their
superior technology allows them to execute trades faster than the
average investor. 76 Despite its potential for temporary price
inefficiency, interval trading puts investors on a level playing field by
restricting the speed at which firms can trade.7 7 Firms also look to limit
certain investors' access to their pools as a means of policing abuse.7 8
For example, Liquidnet prevents certain brokers and traders from

Settles with U.S. SEC Over Dark Pool Claims, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-24/pipeline-agrees-to-pay-1-million-over-secdark-pool-claims [https://perma.cc/32MM-LDTG].
70. Pipeline Trading Sys. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9271, Exchange Act Release No.
65609 (Oct. 24, 2011) (order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings); see
Gallu & Mehta, supra note 69.
71. See Gallu & Mehta, supra note 69.
72. See id.
73. Crossing a block of stock simply means that the buy and sell orders are matched directly
without first routing the order to an exchange or a displayed market. See Eng et al., supra note
13, at 44.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Matthew O'Brien, Everything You Need to Know About High-Frequency Trading,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-youneed-to-know-about-high-frequency-trading/360411/ [https://perma.ccM4N5-TMQ3].
77. See id.
78. See Eng et al., supra note 13, at 44.
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participating in its pool and evicts those who poach or engage in abusive
trade practices. 79
3. Party Trading
Third, dark pools vary in how they allow counterparties to be
matched. Some dark pools only allow one-to-one trading, where only one
buyer can be matched with only one seller.80 Other dark pools allow for
one-to-many or many-to-many trading, where multiple buy and sell
orders can be matched to facilitate execution.8 1 Some argue that
limiting the number of counterparties affects both the available
liquidity and the type of investor willing to engage in a given pool. 82 If
a host only allows one-to-one trading, for example, the firm must find a
matching order before the trade can be executed. Conversely, a host
that allows for one-to-many trading can pool smaller orders and provide
execution to multiple parties at once. Other commentators argue that
aggregating smaller orders to facilitate a sophisticated investor's block
trade is really just an extension of the lit market that disproportionately
favors larger institutions. 83 One might also consider the effect such a
limitation could have on efficient market pricing. Aggregating a number
of smaller orders to facilitate a dark block trade theoretically has the
potential to result in mispricing, information asymmetry, and an
inefficiently priced downstairs market.
4. Order Facilitation
Finally, dark pools differ in the types of orders they will allow or
facilitate. One of the primary differences is whether the pool provides
"committed" or "uncommitted" liquidity.8 4 Uncommitted liquidity
allows the involved investor to receive notification that there is an
interested counterparty and to choose whether it wants to commit to
the trade or not.85 However, this ability runs the risk of "pinging" by

79. See Larry Tabb, Dark Is Hot. But Is it Good?, WALL STREET & TECH., (Aug. 7, 2006),
[https://perma.cc/4VU5http://old.wallstreetandtech.com/dark-is-hot-but-is-it-good/196900251
MEUJ].
80. See Eng et al., supra note 13,. at 45.
81.
See id.
82.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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predatory traders. 6 A "pinging" order is a small order sent out over a
dark pool or other trading medium that is used to detect larger, hidden
orders within the pool. 87 Once a predatory firm detects interest in a
given security, it can then replicate the block in its own portfolio, drive
the price up, and offer the block for sale at the peak price, resulting in
what facially appears to be a degree of arbitrage.8 8
To combat the rising prevalence of predatory trading and market
manipulation, some dark pools adhere to committed liquidity.89
Committed liquidity executes trades without notice to the investor once
the order is placed or sent to the dark pool. 90 Theoretically, such a
procedure hedges against predatory trading activity by not allowing
parties to "back out" of their orders, as would be provided for by
uncommitted liquidity. 9 1 However, one must consider predatory firms'
ability to send out small orders whose significance, executed or not,
serves the same purpose as a ping. Some firms also engage in what are
known as pass-through orders, where a firm will execute internal
orders before moving to market. 92 A sell-side firm, for example, will
send orders through its internal securities pool before sending them to
outside venues. 93
Finally, some dark pools use indications of interest ("Ils").94
IOls are anonymously submitted to the dark pool, and if a counterparty
exists, further human interaction is necessary to complete the trade.95
Some hosts only communicate IOls within the pool itself, while others

86. See Marketbeat Staff, Trading in a Dark Pool? Watch for Sharks, WALL ST. J.:
MARKETBEAT (Aug. 18, 2008, 1:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/08/18/trading-in-adark-pool-watch-for-sharks/ [https://perma.cc/7TXX-2K2M].
87. Id.
88.
See id.
89.
See Eng et al., supra note 13, at 45.
90. Id.
91.
See id.
92. Id.
93.
Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchantsof Liquidity: Market Making from Crowded
Floors to High-Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 663 n.40 (2016) (quoting Paul
Reynolds, Shining a Light on Fixed Income Dark Matter, TABB F. (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/shining-a-light-on-dark-matter [https://perma.cc/89DF-RR3P]):
Compared to the sell-side, the buy-side has an almost zero cost of capital. It has little
or no leverage so does not need the same restrictions to protect the taxpayer from
failure. As a result the buy-side can provide a far superior price for a large and illiquid
order, given the opportunity to price it. Not surprisingly the buy-side lacks the marketmaker infrastructure of the sell-side; see also Eng et al., supranote 13, at 45.
94.
Eng et al., supra note 13, at 45.
95. Id.
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distribute IOls to other pools, creating a trade network. 96 While human
negotiation intuitively has the potential to result in higher transaction
costs, such costs are often miniscule in comparison to the marginal costs
that accompany executing sizeable block trades on the lit market. 97
C. Dark Pool Trading, Generally: Beneficial or Too Risky?
While dark pools vary in form and function, the costs and
benefits are generally applicable. First, dark pool trading and its
delayed disclosure requirements provide investors with the benefit of
anonymity. 98 This anonymity allows pools to execute block trades with
reduced market impact while hedging against informational leakage. 99
If such trades were to be executed on a lit market, the price of the stock
would gradually increase or decrease as the order was filled. Dark pools,
however, allow a large portion of the shares to be directly and
anonymously bought or sold at a predetermined, often more favorable,
price for both the buyer and the seller.10 0 Such anonymity also allows
sophisticated investors to keep their trading strategies private in the
face of a competitive modern securities market.1 0 1
Second, some dark pools receive the added benefit of insulation
from predatory trade activity. 102 As dark pools are not required to
immediately disclose execution or trade information, predatory firms
are-without pinging orders-less able to front-run dark market
trades. 103 Moreover, firms can eliminate or reduce the effect of pinging
orders by employing committed liquidity, a minimum order size, or
both.104 For example, a predatory firm looking to use pinging orders to
solicit bid information will not submit orders to a pool that
automatically executes only large trades without prior notification.
96. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Dark Pool
Regulation Before the Commission Open Meeting (Oct. 21, 2009), http://sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spchl02109mls.htm [https://perma.cc/2EFG-7B8M].
97. See Rhodri Preece, The Pros and Cons of Dark Pools of Liquidity, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6,
3:32
AM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b594f978-54dd-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html
2013,
#axzz4HQuVaqBQ [https://perma.cc/F8QJ-UAYD].
98. See Eng et al., supranote 13, at 45.
99. See id. Informational leakage is simply the inadvertent or unintentional public disclosure
of a given firm's trade activity. Such leakage can result in higher costs, disclosure of a trade
strategy to competitors, and lower profitability. See id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Though such insulation may not be perfect, even modest protection from predatory
HFT or algorithmic trading processes is one of the major benefits sought in the dark market. Id.
102. See Edwin Batista, A Shot in the Dark: An Analysis of the SEC's Response to the Rise of
Dark Pools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83, 111 (2014).
103. See id.
104. See Eng et al., supranote 13, at 45.
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Similarly, a pool can opt to trade at set intervals-instead of on a
continuum-in order to restrict the speed at which predatory firms can
operate, thus putting the pool's participants on an even technological
10
playing field.o
While the benefits of dark market liquidity are numerous and
apparent, they do not come without costs. The major cost to dark
liquidity is lack of information. 106 Dark liquidity at its core involves one
party submitting an order without knowledge of an existing or willing
counterparty.1 07 Accordingly, dark pool participants face the risk of high
opportunity costs.108 In the event an order is placed, the time costs
associated with a dark pool order can be significant if the host is unable
to find a match.1 09 With large block orders, even seemingly insignificant
tick movements could result in sizeable lost profits that could have
10
otherwise been achieved on the lit market.o
The opportunity costs
associated with dark liquidity thus rely heavily on a host's ability to fill
orders. Further, an inability to negotiate the terms of a block trade,
coupled with the inability to see or assess all available liquidity, can
result in fewer orders being filled than even similar upstairs market
venues. 111
Moreover, the nature of certain dark pool orders, coupled with
the large number of available trading venues, can lead to "missed
liquidity."1 12 As dark pool participants are unable to assess available
liquidity, an investor might look to place smaller orders with a number
of different pools, hoping the smaller load will lead to a higher
probability of execution.113 However, the original investor will "miss"
available but unused liquidity if just one pool could have filled the entire
order and the other utilized pools were without available or willing
counterparties.11 4 Thus, not only will a trader have missed out on
valuable liquidity, but it will have also wasted the time and resources
necessary for spreading the order across multiple trading channels."1 5

105. See Marketbeat Staff, supranote 86.
106. See Eng et al., supranote 13, at 45.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Jennifer Conrad, Kevin Johnson & Sunil Wahal, Institutional Trading and
Alternative Trading Systems, 70 J. FIN. EcON. 99, 99-134 (2003).
112. Eng et al., supranote 13, at 46.
113. Id.; see also Conrad, Johnson & Wahal, supra note 111, at 99-134.
114. See Eng et al., supra note 13, at 46.
115. Id.
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Perhaps the most controversial component of dark trading is the
presence and function of HFT activity. HFT differs from traditional
trading in that it does not rely on human action to place or cancel a
given order. 116 HFT uses complex algorithms to submit numerous, rapid
bids and offers, creating a short-term market that enables participants
to profit off minute price changes or simple price imbalances. 117 Thus,
firms using algorithm-based trading systems have a distinct advantage
over firms that use more conventional trading methods.1 18 While the
malleability of algorithms provides for a number of potential strategies
for HFT firms, a recent concept release from the SEC recognized five
general tactics utilized in HFT:
(1) The use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for
generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services and individual
data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and other types of
latencies; (3) very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the
submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5) ending
the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying significant,
unhedged positions overnight). 1 1 9

As explained, the use of high-speed, intelligent computer
programs gives HFT firms an advantage over the average investor by
allowing them to execute trades and detect market movement faster
than a trader using conventional, less costly trading methods. 120 There
are, however, other services that further enhance the advantages of
HFT activity. In In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency
Trading Litigation,12 1 for example, plaintiffs argued that Barclays'sdark pool, Barclays LX, began "catering" its business operations to the
needs of HFT firms in exchange for their robust trading volume, despite
assurances to retail customers that the pools were a haven from
predatory trade activity. 122 The plaintiffs alleged that Barclays LX
provided co-location serviceS 123 and proprietary feeds 124 that were only
beneficial to HFT firms, giving them a distinct technological and

116. See Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency.Trading and Securities
Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1526 (2015).
117. Id.
118. See Yadav, supra note 40, at 1035 (noting that algorithmic trading, generally, is
responsible for "around 50 to 70% of equity volume and an estimated 60% of all trading in futures
markets in the United States").
119. Levens, supra note 116, at 1527 (citing Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept
Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (2010)).
120. Id. at 1529.
121. 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
122. Id.
123. For definition, see infra note 159 and accompanying text.
124. For definition, see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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informational advantage over other investors engaged in the pool. 12 5
Despite such advantages, certain commentators, including the SEC,
have acknowledged that HFT can, in fact, benefit the market by
creating large amounts of liquidity and reducing transaction costs. 12 6
Liquidity also creates a more efficient public market, and more
efficiency provides an informational benefit to ordinary investors. 127 As
such, HFT activity, whether seen as a benefit or risk to the dark
liquidity market, is significant when looking to potential solutions to
dark pool regulation.
Finally, investors may be priced out of this trading system. As
alleged by the plaintiffs in In re Barclays Liquidity,128 many of the
services that make dark liquidity valuable are only available or
valuable to the firms that can afford them. 129 Thus, the costs associated
with general research, algorithmic trading, preferred proprietary
information services, and co-location services create a barrier to entry
for smaller investors. As dark pools vary in form and function, an
investor without the resources to compete with larger, wealthier firms
must spend added time and money researching a potential dark pool to
ensure its orders will not fall subject to predatory trading activity. Some
have even expressed concern that the profitability of dark pools has the
potential to result in reduced liquidity for the retail investor at large. 130
In the face of market manipulation claims and the dark market's
potential for abuse, regulators began grappling with the need for a
solution that protected investors without stripping the dark market of
its perceived value.
D. Competition, Ancillary Services, and the Need for SEC Intervention
In addition to technical advancements in the dark market, dark
liquidity's growing popularity created an increasingly competitive
market leading up to the crisis in 2008.131 At first, an expanding dark
liquidity market resulted in dark market fragmentation. However, a
dark pool host's profitability depends largely on trade volume. 132 As
Regulation ATS made dark pool formation relatively simple, an

125. In re Barclays, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 353.
126. Id. at 350; see also Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,500 (June 29, 2005) ("Shortterm traders clearly provide valuable liquidity to the market.").
127. In re Barclays, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 352.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Hatch, supra note 20, at 1039.
131. See id. at 1040.
132. In re Barclays, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 352.
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increasingly fragmented market resulted in less counterparty
availability and, thus, less volume being executed by individual pools. 1 33
Such an increase in competition and dispersion of trade volume forced
dark pool hosts to devise new products and services to make their
particular exchanges more attractive to outside investors.
First, in responding to this increased competition, dark pool
hosts promoted the use of IOls to facilitate matches between dark pool
participants. 134 As previously stated, after an order was placed and in
the event a counterparty was located, the host used IOls to notify the
parties of the match without requiring immediate execution. 13 5 As
noted, Schapiro and a large sector of the investing public recognized
IOls as the functional equivalent of public price quotes. 136 Though IOls
varied in form, function, and content, they all constituted a notification
to the involved dark market participants that someone was looking to
trade in a given security. 137 Further, not all IOls disclosed the
counterparty or whether the security was being sold or purchased, thus
serving to maintain the benefits of anonymity and delayed disclosure. 138
Many IOls did, however, disclose price information and how said price
fared relative to the National Best Bid and Offer ("NBBO"), or the best
price offered in any market for a given security. 139 The ability to
negotiate and receive 10I notifications resulted in increased liquidity
and trade volume for a number of dark pool hosts, but questions as to
the fairness of such delayed disclosure remained. 140
Second, dark pools found increasing popularity with brokerdealers whose customers provided ready access to large pools of
securities. 14 1 After Regulation NMS, and in an effort to achieve best
execution, almost all major investment banks increased efforts to
execute trades without the use of the public market.142 Outside trading
venues, including dark pools, gave investors better prices and improved
total firm profitability. 1 4 3 Delayed disclosure meant more time for firms
to find the best price on the public market and through other outside

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Hatch, supra note 20, at 1046.
See id. at 1037.
Eng et al., supra note 13, at 45.
Id.
See Hatch, supra note 20, at 1037-38.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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venues. 144 For larger broker-dealers that also provided dark pool
services, securities reserves were a convenient source of liquidity in
facilitating counterparties and boosting overall trade volume. 145 While
the benefits of directing internal order flow to a broker-dealer's own
dark pool remained subject to conjecture, calls for more effective means
of monitoring abuse by dark pool hosts served as a staple in the
criticisms that arose post-2008. 146
Third, hosts implemented "enhanced" or "proprietary" data
feeds. 147 These proprietary data feeds included much of the same
information securities exchanges were required to send to the
consolidated feed post-Reg NMS, but they often included additional
detailed information about the pool's internal trade activity. 1 4 8 Further,
data from the proprietary feeds was sent directly to the feed's
"subscribers," resulting in a distinct informational advantage. 149
Technically, a host is not permitted to transmit the information from
the proprietary feed any earlier than it transmits the information to be
processed by the consolidated tape. 15 0 However, because the
information being sent to subscribers of the proprietary data feed did
not have to be processed, sending the information through both
channels simultaneously still provided the subscribers with the
advantage of time. 151
Fourth, hosts provided select customers with complex and
sophisticated order types. 152 An order type is a preexisting command
that allows traders to tell venues how to handle their bids and offers to
sell stock. 153 For example, a limit order-or a command for an exchange
to buy a stock at a decided price-constitutes just one of the "hundreds"
of available complex order types. 154 The more complex the order type,
the more factors that go into deciding when a given trade is to be

144. Id. at 1036.
145. See id. at 1038.
146. Id.
147. See In re Barclays Liquidity Cross and High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d
342, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
148. Id.
149. See id.; N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC & N.Y.S.E. Euronext, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67857,
2012 WL 4044880, at *8 (Sept. 14, 2012) (requiring the Exchanges to take "reasonable steps to
ensure ... that ... data relating to current best-priced quotations and trades through proprietary
feeds [are released] no sooner than . . . data [sent] to the . . . Processor" for integration into the
consolidated feed).
150. In re Barclays, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 351.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 351-52.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 352.
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executed.15 5 An order type discussed in In re Barclays called a "hideand-light" order, for example, is where a given order will not appear as
a bid or offer on an exchange until the stock reaches a particular price,
at which point the order "lights" and jumps the queue of investors
waiting to trade. 15 6 This order type offers a distinct advantage because,
where most investors join the queue as they place orders with a
particular venue, hide-and-light orders immediately move to the front
of the line, ensuring a form of best execution.1 5 7 Consequently, investors
without access to these types of complex order types often receive a
worse price for their securities, and thus, less profitability. 15 8
Finally, certain hosts provided a service called "co-location." Colocation allows traders to install their servers at or near the servers
used to execute trades on a given trade venue. 159 This practice allows
for traders using advanced trading hardware and software to shave
fractions of a second off a given trade. 160 When combined with
algorithmic trading, co-location services allow advanced traders to
profit off of even smaller price discrepancies. 1 6 1 As is the case with
proprietary feeds, co-location services offer distinct advantages to a
select group of investors with the necessary financial and technological
means. 162
As the SEC requires approval for certain services such as
proprietary data feeds, co-location, and complex order types, it should
be noted that there are some perceived benefits to these special
products and services. 163 Arguably, proprietary feed information can be,
properly disseminated without resulting in an informational deficiency
for nonmembers. Complex order types that are not of use or interest to
smaller investors might help promote liquidity and best execution.
Certainly, similar arguments could be made for the use of co-location
services. However, even with SEC approval, certain dark pool
customers, such as those involved with Barclays LX and Crossfinder,
have still found themselves subject to fraud and manipulation.1 6 4

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., UBS Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9697, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 74060, 2015 WL 179551, at *2 (Jan. 15, 2015).
159. See In re Barclays, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 351.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-59606, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,293 (Mar. 26, 2009).
164. Id.
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II. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE ISSUES SURROUNDING
DARK LIQUIDITY AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS

To address the various issues facing dark pool regulation and
investor protection, the SEC proposed a number of remedies, including
lowering the daily trade volume threshold from five percent, the real
time disclosure of IOls under $200,000, and the real time disclosure of
all trades under $200,000.165 However, the net benefits and practicality
of these proposals have long been contested.
A. Adjusting the Daily Trade Volume Threshold
First, under Reg NMS, if a pool executes more than the SECprescribed five percent threshold of a given stock's daily trading
volume, it must provide open access to all market participants. 16 6
Providing open access would require the given dark pool host to disclose
internal price quotes, negating the benefits of anonymity and reduced
market impact.167 Despite this seemingly strict trading volume
restriction, some opponents of dark liquidity argue the limit should drop
to as low as .25%-a ninety-five percent reduction. 168
To be sure, such a restriction would keep more trading volume
on the lit market, thus reducing the potential negative side effects of
dark market activity. 169 As mentioned, however, the profitability of a
given dark pool relies largely on trade volume. As such, this trade
volume restriction has the potential to significantly reduce or eliminate
dark pool activity altogether. 170 Opponents of the reduced threshold
argue that such a restriction would require hosts to constantly check
each security's liquidity against national averages, resulting in
inefficiency and administrative difficulty. 17 1 Furthermore, these
opponents argue, and the SEC has acknowledged, that extreme limits
on the use of dark liquidity might cause investment capital to leave U.S.
equity markets. 172 The current, or a higher, trade volume threshold

165. Hatch, supra note 20, at 1043.
166. Id.; see also Batista, supra note 102, at 92-93. This excludes trades that are valued at
more than $200,000. Id.
167. Hatch, supra note 20, at 1044.
168. Id. at 1045.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1046.
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might also facilitate best execution by allowing individual pools to route
larger offers and orders to other dark pools. 1 73
More importantly, in a regulatory regime that does not limit the
number of dark pools a given bank or private entity can host, why send
order flow to a competitor when one can simply create another internal
dark pool? 1 7 4 The trade volume threshold thus seems to have an inverse
relationship with the number of available dark pools, resulting in
fragmentation. The lower the threshold, the more dark pools that will
be created, thus resulting in higher research costs, missed liquidity, and
higher barriers to entry for investors.1 7 5 As increased fragmentation
will result in heightened levels of missed liquidity, such a reduction
would also result in more rampant price inefficiency. As the number of
venues rises in tandem with dark market popularity, more liquidity will
be syphoned from the lit market and lost in a system of dark pool hosts
unable to find willing or able counterparties. As such, the lower volume
threshold does not seem as though it would fix many of the broader
perceived issues with dark market liquidity.
B. Public Disclosure of Indicationsof Interest
A second proposed solution to the issues surrounding dark
liquidity involves making public the content of dark pool IOIs with a
value under $200,000.176 After being appointed to the head of the SEC,
Schapiro acknowledged IOIs as one of the most contentious issues tied.
to dark pool regulation.1 7 7 IOIs, Schapiro noted, were "functionally and
economically similar to public quotes."1 78 Yet, as a result of dark pool
trading's high costs and related barriers to entry, larger dark pool
participants found themselves with a distinct informational advantage
over those unable to afford dark market participation. 1 7 9 Making IOls
public would, in the eyes of the SEC, even the informational playing
field for smaller investors.18 0 Furthermore, such a lower threshold

173. Id. at 1045-46.
174. See id. at 1045; see also Rachelle Younglai, SEC Proposes to Shed Light on "DarkPools,"
2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59K50K20091021
REUTERS,
Oct.
21,
[https://perma.cc/4G9P-QW58] ("[T]here is nothing stopping dark pool operators from running
multiple dark pools." (quoting Adam Sussman, director of research for TABB Group Consultants)).
175. See Hatch, supra note 20, at 1047.
176. Id. at 1043.
177. Id. at 1041.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id.; see also James A. Brigagliano, Co-Acting Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address to the 2009 SIFMA Market Structure Conference (May
20, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2009/spchO52009jab.htm [https://perma.cc/BJ8F-T3T9]
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might further protect against predatory trade activity: smaller pinging
orders would be made public, while larger orders would retain the dark
market's benefits, including anonymity. Despite such protection, public
IOls are not without their drawbacks.
Ils arguably allow matches to be made more quickly, as the
negotiations that come with 101 exchanges result in added
transparency and potentially higher order flow.""1 Public 101 disclosure
would negate many of the dark market's perceived benefits for less
frequently traded stocks, as the significance of $200,000 worth of
securities varies depending on the size or market cap of the underlying
entity. 182 Further, dark pools have an inherent interest in protecting
against 101 abuse. 183 Dark pools that do not adequately protect their
clients' interests will lose favor with dark market players, eventually
leading to lower trade volume and shrinking profitability. Given that
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority has already threatened
dark pool hosts with potential fines and sanctions for 101 fraud or
misrepresentation, heightened disclosure requirements could result in
excess regulation and compliance costs. 1 8 4 Though 101 disclosure seems
to hedge against informational discrepancies and predatory HFT
activity, questions remain as to whether such disclosure would deprive
the dark market of its intended purpose.
C. Real Time Back-End Disclosure
Finally, the SEC has proposed heightened back-end trade
disclosure, requiring the real time release of information on trades
under $200,000.185 As stated, dark pools are only required to disclose
trade information postexecution. 186 Further, the restriction for posting
trade information to the consolidation tape required by Reg NMS is lax
and lacks specificity. 187 The SEC's third proposed solution to dark
liquidity would require hosts to immediately post trades to the
consolidation tape along with identifying information about the trade,
("When it comes to managing financial risks, there truly is no substitute for financial products
traded in transparent markets capable of generating price discovery that properly incorporates
the risk of those products.").
181. Hatch, supranote 20, at 1047.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1048.
184. Id.
185. Batista, supra note 102, at 110, 112.
186. See id. at 110 ("The SEC's third proposal would require ATSs to report real-time posttrade data.").
187. See id. (discussing how real time post-trade data can result in problematic informational
leakage).
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the parties involved, and the related host for trades, as long as the trade
has a value that is less than $200,000.188 However, this solution is
wanting.
True, this proposal has a number of benefits and would likely
meet the least amount of resistance from dark pool proponents.1 89 Once
a dark pool has executed a given trade, the risk of predatory market
movement based on an investor's particular position no longer exists. 190
Heightened back-end disclosure requirements would also help smaller
investors more efficiently research the potential liquidity and execution
gains to be had in the dark market. 19 1 Further, regulators could more
efficiently monitor dark pool activity and protect against abuse or
manipulation by hosts. 192 Heightened trade disclosure requirements,
coupled with the strict trade volume limitations, might also convince
concerned investors that the dark market is of limited significance and.
that the lit market is safe and at least generally efficient.
However, real time post-trade data reporting creates a risk of
informational leakage, which can be used by predatory firms to exploit
dark market traders. 193 These predatory firms may be able to identify
the buyers and sellers if a trade is attributed to a particular ATS on the
consolidation tape, and such information could then be used to trade
against those parties or enter into transactions that would affect the
price of the security within the ATS. 194 This issue is especially prevalent
in the face of HFT firms. 195 Instead of requiring real time trade
disclosure, at least one commentator has suggested that the SEC should
allow hosts to wait until the end of the day to report trade activity. 196
By allowing end of day disclosure, investors could avoid predatory trade
activity, and the market could still receive updated, useful information
about daily trade activity.197 This commentator further argues that the

SEC could even require real time reporting to its office for regulatory
purposes while waiting until the end of the day to make such
information public. 198

188.
189.
190.
191.

See Hatch, supra note 20, at 1043.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
See id. (setting reporting standards

institutional investors).

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Batista, supra note 102, at 110.
Id.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 111.
Id.
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While these proposals come with mixed benefits and drawbacks,
the SEC should promulgate a dark market-wide quality trade
facilitation rating to allow current and prospective dark market
participants to draw meaningful comparisons about the effect different
services and trade processes have on execution quality.
III. RECONCILING THE DARK WITH THE LIGHT

There are more than forty active ATSs registered with the SEC,
and it is estimated that these forty pools accounted for almost eighteen
percent of all trading in National Market System stocks between 2014
and 2015.199 Some larger ATSs have even facilitated more trades than
some of the smaller public exchanges. 200 Though factors such as reduced
market volatility, attractive fee structures, price improvements, and
improved processing speeds have contributed to the rise of these
alternative exchange venues, the main contributor to such sustained
growth has undoubtedly been the endless search for best execution. 201
While an end to dark pools altogether seems to be an unrealistic and
unwarranted change, the current structure of dark pool transparency
is flawed and has resulted in a number of issues that have caught the
attention of investors and the SEC alike. SEC implementation of a
rating system that gives prospective dark pool participants information
on quality trade facilitation would allow those investors to make
meaningful comparisons as to the effect such varied services have on
execution quality and missed liquidity. As this is a more expansive
version of an already-proposed regulation, such a resolution would
serve only to afford more protection for dark pool players on a marketwide basis. 202

A. Taking ATS-N a Step Further
While previously proposed solutions to dark pool regulation
seem to have a certain degree of merit in assuaging investor concerns
regarding liquidity, efficiency, and fairness, many criticisms of dark
liquidity remain unresolved. Notably, the SEC announced another
proposed amendment to Reg ATS in 2015, known as Regulation ATS-N
("Reg ATS-N"), that seeks to increase front-end reporting standards for

199. Luis A. Aguilar, Public Statement: Shedding Light on Dark Pools, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/shedding-light-on-darkpools.html [https://perma.cc/S94S-6B6F].
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Geiger & Mamudi, supra note 1.
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dark pools. 2 0 3 SEC Chair Mary Jo White noted in the SEC's press
release on Reg ATS-N that "investors and other market participants
need more and better information about how alternative trading
systems work." 2 04 These disclosures-which would be made public on

the SEC's website-would include information regarding trading by the
pool and its affiliates on the ATS, available order types, and the ATS's
execution and priority procedures. 205 The SEC also noted that Reg ATSN would "allow market participants to better evaluate whether to do
business with an ATS, as well as to be better informed when evaluating
order handling decisions made by their broker." 206 However, ATS-N
does not go far enough.
1. Quality Trade Facilitation Report
The SEC should regularly issue a report that rates each host's
ability to facilitate quality execution relative to other pools and the open
market. As mentioned, missed liquidity occurs when traders spread
large bulk orders over multiple pools in hopes that smaller order sizes
will result in a higher probability of execution. 207 Not only do these
traders miss liquidity, but they do so without being able to properly
evaluate the effect different services have on execution quality. Here,
Reg ATS-N takes a strong first step. If passed, Reg ATS-N will allow
participants to compare pools by trade affiliates, available order types,
and execution and priority procedures, among other criteria. 208 Yet,
while hosts must disclose trades following execution, they are not
required to disclose the number of unfilled orders submitted to their
respective pool, leaving traders unable to properly evaluate the effect
such services have on missed liquidity and trade facilitation.
Consequently, a pool that receives fewer orders but has a higher rate of
quality execution as a result of its services or restrictions might be
perceived as offering a less effective trading platform. To allow Reg
ATS-N and the market for dark liquidity services to effectively govern,
and to cure the current information asymmetry between hosts and
traders, the SEC should provide dark pool participants with a
meaningful standard against which to compare available pools and

203. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance Transparency and
Oversight of Alternative Trading Systems (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-261.html [https://perma.cc/5EJH-SNM7].
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Eng et al., supra note 13, at 46.
208. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 203.

336

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:311

services. This might, similar to credit ratings, take the form of a AAAD rating system based on the services offered, adherence to Reg ATS-N
disclosures, spreads, public price quotes, order size, order type, and
other dark orders, with AAA being "Excellent" quality trade facilitation,
BBB being "Market", and D being "Poor" facilitation relative to other
available pools. Using predetermined, uniform SEC standards to
identify pools as more or less prone to quality trade facilitation would
maintain anonymity, promote predictability, and limit fragmentation.
Such a system would also reduce the research costs incurred in
compiling and comparing each pool's opaque trade history.
Further, this quality trade facilitation report would obviate the
need to engage in the previously proposed solutions to dark liquidity or
added regulation. As participants could properly identify and evaluate
which services and restrictions correlate with higher quality execution
probabilities, larger orders could be placed with a smaller number of
trade venues. Thus, the five percent threshold would actually serve to
limit missed liquidity and retard fragmentation. While Reg ATS-N
would require pools to publicly disclose services such as the use and
forms of IOls, meaningful comparison criteria would allow the market
to govern which services achieve best execution and provide superior
investor protection. Such a report, in conjunction with Reg ATS-N,
would also strengthen hosts' natural incentive to protect against 101
misuse, as heightened disclosure of each pool's trade policies and
services would make it easier for customers to research and identify
pools more suited to their particular trade preferences. Finally, this
proposal would only serve to supplant heightened back-end disclosure,
as back-end trade disclosure does little to address issues relating to
missed liquidity and execution quality.
CONCLUSION

In order for the market to effectively govern, market
participants need access to the information that allows them to make
informed investment decisions. The dark liquidity market is, despite
the passing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act in 2010, a highly unregulated market sector. With the
passing of Reg NMS, the SEC instituted certain protocols intended to
limit the perceived downsides to dark liquidity. 2 09 However, calls for
heightened back-end disclosure, a reduced daily trade volume

209. Eng et al., supranote 13, at 46.
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threshold, and enhanced 101 disclosure left participants without
meaningful evaluative tools.

2 10

Therefore, the SEC would benefit by implementing an
independent, dark market-wide reporting system addressing quality
trade facilitation. A system that allows investors to draw meaningful
comparisons between pools and their related services would help limit
fragmentation, prevent against market manipulation, promote
liquidity, foster predictability, reduce transaction costs, cure
information asymmetry, and reduce barriers to entry for prospective
dark market participants. In sum, this proposal-a more expansive
version of Reg ATS-N-would be a proper and effective way to balance
the dark with the light.
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